Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1976

Ronald Vickery v. Robert Kaiser, Martha Kaiser,
Stanely Wade, Janet Wade, and Shangri-La Garden
Apartments : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Brian M. Barnard; Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Elliott J. Williams; Snow, Christensen and Martineau; Attorneys for Defendant-Respondents.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Vickery v. Kaiser, No. 14432.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1976).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/295

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

SZJUa«

UMH S U P

3*

^ME

C0Ufir

BRIEF,,
UW
IN

THE

S U P R E M E
OF

*-lBRAiy

COURT,

THE
"i » •

STATE

OF

UTAH

."r'^.^^/v

RONALD VICKERY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No.
14432

vs.
ROBERT KAISER, MARTHA KAISER,
STANLEY WADE, JANET WADE, and
SHANGRI-LA GARDEN APARTMENTS,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM A DECISION AND JUDGMENT OF THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRIAN M. BARNARD
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
ELLIOT J. WILLIAMS
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN
Seventh Floor
Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for DefendantsRespondents

LE
APR 19 1976

Clcr!:, Supremo Court, Utah
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN

THE

S U P R E M E
OF

S T A T E

COURT

THE
OF

UTAH

RONALD VICKERY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No
14432

ROBERT KAISER, MARTHA KAISER,
STANLEY WADE, JANET WADE, and
SHANGRI-LA GARDEN APARTMENTS,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM A DECISION AND JUDGMENT OF THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRIAN M. BARNARD
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Attorney for PlaintiffAppellant
ELLIOT J. WILLIAMS
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN
Seventh Floor
Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for DefendantsRespondents
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

" TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT C~ '1ATUFF '?F 'JASE. . .
RF! I™17 SOUGHT
•i.-ww-

•:"•' M
«;-

. .' .

.

-A;

._.„UMENT

":u "r INDANTS LIABILITY UNDER CAUSES OF
AJTI..N IN BOTH FORCIBLE ENTRY AND WRONGFUL
E'-:.:iION WAS RES JUDICATA AND THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN RECONSIDERING THAT ISSUE
AND REQUIRING THE PLAINTIFF TO ELECT
BETWEEN THOSE CAUSES OF ACTION AT THE
TIME OF TRIAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fomt li

THE REQUIREMENT OF AN ELECTION BETWEEN
DAMAGES IN FORICBLE ENTRY OR WRONGFUL
EVICTION WAS ERROR. . . . . .
Point III
THE COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING AN ELECTION
BETWEEN REMEDIES BEFORE THE COMMENCEMENT
OF THE TRIAL
. , , « . , .
CONCLUSION

AUTHORITIES CITED
CASES
Eccles vs Union Pacific Coal Co , 15 U. 14,
^3 P. 148 , .
, ,
.,..',.
Forrester vs Cook,

,-1

II, L ',, 29.. !-' 2 0 6 , . ,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3

Freeway Park Building, Inc, vs Western States
Wholesale Supply, 22 U,2d 266, 451 P,2d
/

/ O

•

O

O

O

•

9

O

9

•

O

O

•

0

9

9

O

«

•

•

•

«

Lambert vs Sine, 123 U, 145, 256 P. 2d 241 .... .
Mecham vs Nelson, 92 Idaho 783, 451 P.2d 529. . .
North American Graphic Corp. vs Allan, 184 F,2d
387
Pearson vs Harfer, 87 Idaho 245, 329 P.2d 687 . .
Peterson vs Piatt, 16 U.2d 330, 400 P.2d 507. . .
Wangsgard vs Fitzpatrick, ' U.2d
, 542 P.2d
194
7 T . . ."7". . . . . .
Williams vs Marshall, 37 Cal.2d 445, 235 P.2d 372

STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-36-10. . . .
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 72(a) . . . .
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 73. . . . . .

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Restatement, Judgments, Section 1 . . . . . . . .
25 Am, Jur.2d, Election of Remedies, Sections
10-12

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

I
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the decision and judgment of the
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Gordon Hall, judge presiding,
entered on December 18, 1975.

Prior to that proceeding the

Court ruled that the Defendants were guilty of forcible
entry and detainer and guilty of wrongful eviction, in a
partial summary judgment signed and entered on May 8, 1975,
the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., judge presiding.

At

the time for trial, the Court, the Honorable Gordon Hall,
judge presiding, ruled that the Plaintiff must elect and
pursue only one cause of action,either forcible entry and
detainer, or wrongful eviction in proving damages suffered
by the Plaintiff. The Court further ruled that the Plaintiff
could not seek punitive damages under a cause of action in
forcible entry and detainer.

The matter was submitted to the

jury which returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff and
against the Defendants in the sum of twenty ($20.00) dollars.
The Plaintiff-Appellant would contend that the trial Court
erred in requiring the Plaintiff to elect between the two
causes of action, forcible entry and detainer, or wrongful
eviction at the time of trial, and in ruling that the Plaintiff
could not seek punitive damages under a cause of action in
forcible entry and detainer.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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II
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Plaintiff-Appellant seeks a reversal of the
judgment and decision of the trial Court and that the case
i

be remanded to the trial Court for a new trial.
Ill
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, Ronald Vickery, brought suit on March 14,
1975 against his landlords, the Defendants, in both forcible
entry and wrongful eviction.

These causes of action were

pleaded cumulatively, not alternatively (R. 1-8) . Plaintiff
moved for summary judgment on the liability issue under both
causes of action (R. 17). On May 8th, 1975 the Court, the
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., judge presiding, granted
said motion.

The order reads, in relevant part:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the PLaintiff is granted
a Partial Summary Judgment that the Defendants
jointly and severally are liable to the Plaintiff for
their actions in the nature of forcible entry and
detainer and for wrongful eviction as set forth in
Plaintiff's Complaint. All matters with regard to the
amount of damages suffered by the Plaintiff shall be
resolved in a trial hearing and trial. (R. 27-28)
Defendants did not appeal this decision, nor did they
preserve the issue for later appeal by filing notice
pursuant to Rule 72 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
On December 18th, 1975, immediately prior to commencement
of the trial on damages, the court, the Honorable Gordon
Hall, judge presiding, granted (over Plaintiff's objection)
Defendants' motion that Plaintiff be required to elect
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(R. 114-124)

Plaintiff elected forcible entry.

At

trial Plaintiff did not prove special damages but did prove
general damages-i.e. harm to Plaintiff's dignitary interests.
The Court ruled the Plaintiff could not prove punitive
damages in a forcible entry action (R. 114-124) . The Court
ultimately instructed the jury that general damages were
recoverable under the Forcible Entry Statute, it had earlier
ruled that they were not.

Similarly, in chambers after

Defendants1 motion for directed verdict the Court reversed
its decision requiring an election, and then reversed the
reversal. (R. 118-120).

The jury returned a verdict of

twenty ($20.00) dollars in favor of the Plaintiff.

(R. 86)

Plaintiff's motion for a new trial was denied. (R. 97-98)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEFENDANTS LIABILITY UNDER CAUSES OF ACTION IN
BOTH FORCIBLE ENTRY AND WRONGFUL EVICTION WAS RES JUDICATA
AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RECONSIDERING THAT ISSUE AND
REQUIRING THE PLAINTIFF TO ELECT BETWEEN THOSE CAUSES OF
ACTION AT THE TIME OF TRIAL.
The Court's Order granting summary judgment as to
liability under both forcible entry and wrongful eviction
was signed and entered on May 8th, 1975.

Rule 73 of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure gives litigants one month
after the entry of a judgment or order to perfect a direct
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.

Rule 72 (a) gives litigants

the right to preserve an issue for appeal by filing notice
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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7
further issues remain to be determined.

At the expiration of

these time periods, Defendants1 liability under both causes
of action was inalterably fixed by accepted principles of
res judicata.

Restatement, Judgments § 1.

Therefore, it

was not proper for the Court to eliminate the Defendantsf
liability under one cause of action by requiring an election.
The Court was limited to the determination of the "amount
of damages suffered by the Plaintiff" under each cause of
action.

Any danger of double recovery could have been

avoided by allocating overlapping items of damage to one
cause of action or the other via jury instructions.

The

Plaintiff should have been allowed by the trial Court to
proceed on both causes of action.
POINT II
THE REQUIREMENT OF AN ELECTION BETWEEN DAMAGES IN
FORCIBLE ENTRY OR WRONGFUL EVICTION WAS IN ERROR.
Prior Utah case law is of little assistance in determining
whether forcible entry and wrongful eviction are alternative
or cumulative remedies.

There is only one reported case,

Wangsgard v. Fitzpatrick, 542 p.2d 194 (1975). in which
both causes of action were pleaded, and that case did not
deal with the central issue here.
When a Plaintiff has two inconsistent remedies available
to him for the redress of a single right, he is required
by the doctrine of election of remedies to elect one of
those remedies. 25 Am. Jur. 2d, Election of Remedies,§§
10-12.

Both forcible entry and wrongful eviction are

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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remedies for the redress of the same right - the right to be
secure in one's dwelling from the forcible entries of third
persons.

The crucial issue is whether they are inconsistent.

If so, there is the further question of when the Plaintiff
should be required to elect.
"Inconsistency'1 as used here does not mean mere theoretics
inconsistency - though the doctrine is often applied in
contract cases to limit recovery to remedies based either on
affirmance and disaffirmance of the contract. In any event,
there is nothing theoretically inconsistent in a dispossessed
Plaintiff asking to be restored to possession of his property
under Forcible Entry, and to be fully compensated under some
combination of forcible entry and wrongful eviction for the
injury he suffered, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary, and
also for a punitive damage recovery.
The inconsistency here at issue is whether allowing
recovery under both remedies would over-compensate the
Plaintiff.

Whether this is so depends on the remedial

elements under both causes of action.

Plaintiff concedes,

that he should not recover twice for the same remedial
element.
Under wrongful eviction, Plaintiff may recover for
pecuniary damage incidental to the forcible entry; for
injury to his dignitary interests - humiliation, mental
anguish, etc. Lambert v. Sine, 123 Utah 145, 256 p. 2d 241
(1953); and for punitive damages in a proper case.

Freeway

Park Building, Inc. v. Western States Wholesale Supply, 22
Utah Digitized
2d 266,
451W. p.
778 J. Reuben
(1969).
Clearly,
no writ of
by the Howard
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Law Library,
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restitution will issue in a wrongful eviction action.
Under forcible entry, Plaintiff may obtain a writ of

<

restitution, and also three times Mthe damages occasioned
to" him by the forcible entry.

U. C. A. §78-36-10 (1953).

The treble damages provision has been considered "highly
penal" by the Utah Court and thus subject to strict constructioi
Forrester v. Cook, 77 U. 137 at 155, 292 p.206 at 214 (1930),
In the case at bar, the trial Court originally felt that only
pecuniary damage incidental to ouster was subject to
trebling, but later instructed the jury that general damage
was also recoverable under the statute.

Whether the trial

Court was correct in so doing is open to question in
view of the strict construction of doctrine.

General

damages would seem to fit writhin the statutory language
"damage to the Plaintiff".
The trial Court further held that punitive damages
were not recoverable in forcible entry proceedings,
presumably on the theory that the treble damages provision
is punitive in itself.

This ruling contradicts Peterson

v. Piatt, 16 Utah 2d 330, 400 p. 2d 507 (1965) in which
punitive damages were awarded and apparently trebled.

It

further results in the anomaly that a malicious Defendant
with no legal interest in the property is no more liable
under forcible entry than a non-malicious owner who merely
wants rightful possession of his property, and forcibly
enters in the mistaken belief that he is within the law in
doing so.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to determine whether forcible entry and wrongful eviction is
are inconsistent remedies because the elements of damage
recoverable under forcible entry are ill-defined.

It is

Plaintiff's position that the law should:
1) fully compensate a Plaintiff for Defendant's
forcible entry - i.e. that he should recover both
pecuniary and non-pecuniary general damage (plus
special damages had he been able to prove them), and
punitive damages, and
2)

allow him to choose, without affecting his recoverable

damages, whether he wishes to be restored to possession.
Insofar as this result may be reached by allowing Plaintiff
to recover under both forcible entry and wrongful eviction,
Plaintiff maintains those actions are not inconsistent and
should be considered cumulative.
Under the treble damages provision U. C. A. 78-36-10
(1953) as it is now interpreted by Utah Courts it is difficult
to achieve the desired result.

Plaintiff therefore urges that

Utah adopt an interpretation similar to that Idaho has taken
with regard to its nearly identical treble damages provision.
In Pearson v. Harfer, 87 Idaho 245, 329 p. 2d 687 (1964),
the Idaho Supreme Court stated at 694:
We are of the view that the legislative intent...
was to require, as a prerequisite to an award of treble
damages, a finding that the waste was willfully,
wantonly, or maliciously commited. There being
no finding by the trial*court in this regard...
the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded
for the trial court to enter specific findings
thereon..,
In Mecham
Nelson,
92Library,
Idaho
Digitized by v.
the Howard
W. Hunter Law
J. Reuben783,
Clark Law451
School, p.
BYU. 2d 529 (1969)
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11
elements of damage ( not merely waste) under the Idaho
forcible entry statute.
It is clear from the Utah case Eccles v. Union Pacific
Coal Co. , III, 14, 48P. 148, that a Court lacks discretion
as to the trebling of damages in a forcible detainer action,
and that if there was a forcible detainer the damages suffered
must be trebled.

It is clear that under Utah law malicious

or the intentions which normally justify an award of
punitive damages are irrelevant in awarding treble damages
in unlawful detainer and forcible entry actions.

Thus

under current Utah law treble damages are not a substitute
for punitive damages.
A tenant wrongfully disturbed in his occupancy should
be fully compensated for the damage suffered, both general
and special.

In addition, if the facts warrant, the tenant

should be allowed to recover punitive damages.

In order to

accomplish this end, a Plaintiff should not be required
to elect between damages in forcible entry or wrongful
eviction by should be allowed to pursue both causes and the COT.
should instruct the jury as to duplicate damages or the Court
after a verdict should consider and eliminate any duplicate
damages.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING AN ELECTION BETWEEN
REMEDIES BEFORE THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE TRIAL.
There is a split of authority as to when an election
should be required.

This is understandable because of the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
varying
causes
of action involved, and the differing
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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possibilities of prejudice to the Defendant if election
delayed.

Many Courts have insisted that no election be

required before the case is submitted to the judge or
jury.

In Williams v. Marshall, 37 Cal. 2d 445 at 457,

235 P. 2d 372 at 379 (1951) the California Supreme Court
stated:
At various stages of the trial, the Marshalls
unsuccessfully moved the trial Court to compel
an election between the alternative remedies of
rescission and damages. They argue that as a result
of these erroneous rulings, they were compelled to
defend on both theories.
A defrauded vendee may, in the same action, seek
rescission or damages in the event rescission cannot
be obtained...there is no good reason why the Plaintiff
in such an action should be compelled to make an election
between those remedies during the course of the trial,
and such a rule would be contrary to fundamental
principles of law.
See also North American Graphic Corporation v. Allan, 184
F. 2d 387 (1950) where the Court allowed Plaintiff to go to
the jury on both contract and quasi-contract theories because
the Defendant did not show detrimental reliance on Plaintiff's
prior actions indicating he would proceed on a contract theory.
In the instant case, there was no detrimental reliance
on Defendants' part.

He came to Court fully prepared to

defend both causes of action.

His motion for election was

made immediately prior to trial.

His interests would not

have been unfairly prejudiced had the trial Court permitted
Plaintiff to proceed ot prove both causes of action, and to
elect his remedy before going to the jury.
who was unfairly prejudiced here.

It was Plaintiff

His whole trial plan

was upset by the requirement of election immediately
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(and without prior notice) before trial.

Furthermore, in

view of the unsettled law on recoverable damages in forcible
entry, he could not possible make an informed election in
any event.
Therefore, it was error to require an election before
trial under the facts of this case.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff-Appellant respectfully submits that
the District Court erroneously required the Plaintiff
at the time of trial to elect between pursuing damages
under a cause of action in Forcible Entry or a cause
of action in Wrongful Eviction, and erroneously ruled
that the Plaintiff could not seek and prove punitive
damages under a cause of action in Forcible Entry0
The decision and judgment of the Trial Court
should be reversed, and the matter remanded to the
Trial Court for a new trial with appropriate
instructions from this Court0

Respectfully submitted,

BRIAN M 0 BARNARD
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for PlaintiffAppellant
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I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Elliott Williams,
Worsely, Snow and Christensen, Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents, 700 Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84101, postage prepaid in the United States
Postal Service, this 16th day of April, 1976.

BRIAN M. BARNARD
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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